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Abstract The paper discusses Bayesian convergence when the truth is excluded
from the analysis by means of a simple coin-tossing example. In the fair-balance
paradox a fair coin is tossed repeatedly. A Bayesian agent, however, holds the a
priori view that the coin is either biased towards heads or towards tails. As a result
the truth (i.e., the coin is fair) is ignored by the agent. In this scenario the Bayesian
approach tends to confirm a false model as the data size goes to infinity. I argue that
the fair-balance paradox reveals an unattractive feature of the Bayesian approach to
scientific inference and explore a modification of the paradox.
1 Introduction
The problem of convergence to the truth in Bayesian inference has been widely
discussed in the philosophical literature (e.g., Hesse 1974; Glymour 1980; Earman
1992; Kelly 1996; Hawthorne 2011; Belot 2013). Convergence to the truth results
establish conditions under which the degrees of belief of Bayesian agents become
more and more tightly peaked around the true hypothesis as the data accumulate. A
general assumption of Bayesian convergence theorems is that the true hypothesis is
included in the set of candidate hypotheses. In the discrete probability spaces
containing a finite set of statistically simple hypotheses that are frequently
I would like to thank Mike Steel for his help with the proof in the ‘‘Appendix’’. I would also like to thank
Ken Binmore, Casey Helgeson, Jason Konek, Samir Okasha, Richard Pettigrew, Joel Velasco, Charlotte
Werndl and the anonymous referees of the journal for helpful comments on earlier versions of the
manuscript. An award from the British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship Scheme is gratefully
acknowledged.
& Bengt Autzen
b.autzen@bristol.ac.uk
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol BS6 6JL, UK
123
Erkenn (2018) 83:253–263
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9888-0
considered in the philosophical literature this amounts to the requirement that the
true hypothesis gets assigned non-zero prior probability.1
In this paper I am interested in a different problem: what happens if the truth is
excluded in a Bayesian analysis? In particular, what happens if the true model is
excluded and the false candidate models are equidistant from the truth in Bayesian
model selection? The example I will explore looks fairly benign. Suppose a fair coin
is tossed repeatedly and a Bayesian agent holds, for whatever reason, the a priori
view that the coin is either biased towards heads or towards tails. As a result the
truth (i.e., the coin is fair) is ignored by the agent. The question that I will address is
what degrees of belief the agent will adopt in the long run as the number of coin
tosses goes to infinity.
In order to study the coin-tossing example in detail, its probabilistic assumptions
have to be specified and some terminology has to be introduced. It is assumed that the
coin tosses are independent and identically distributed with parameter p denoting the
probability of the coin landing ‘heads’ in a single coin toss. The number of ‘heads’ in
n tosses is then described by the Binomial distribution B(n, p). I will refer to a
‘model’ as a family of probability distributions. For instance, the family of Binomial
distributions B(n, p) described in terms of the parameters n and p qualifies as a
model. Every numerical choice of n and p specifies a particular probability
distribution describing the number of ‘heads’ in n coin tosses. For any fixed n, I will
consider three models: the fair-coin model MF containing only the Binomial
distribution with parameter p equal to 1
2
, the head-bias model MH containing all
Binomial distributions with p[ 1
2
and the tail-bias model MT containing all
Binomial distributions with p\ 1
2
.2 Since the agent is indifferent about whether the
coin is biased towards heads or towards tails, she assigns equal prior probability to
the two candidate models (i.e., PðMHÞ ¼ PðMTÞ ¼ 12). As a result the true model MF
is excluded, that is,MF has zero prior probability in the discrete model space.
3 Given
the head-bias model MH , she is indifferent with regard to the precise numerical
probability p and assumes that p follows a uniform distribution on the interval ð1
2
; 1Þ,
denoted as Uð1
2
; 1Þ. Similarly, she assumes that parameter p follows a uniform
distribution on the interval ð0; 1
2
Þ given the tail-bias model MT .
Before assessing the limiting behaviour of the model posterior probabilities in the
coin-tossing example, some general comments on the approach of this paper are in
order. Considering the situation in which the prior degrees of belief of an agent are
1 In continuous probability spaces matters are more complicated. Here the requirement is relaxed to the
effect that each open subset containing the true hypothesis has non-zero prior probability. In general,
including the true hypothesis in the support of the prior is necessary but not sufficient for convergence to
the truth. Freedman (1963) shows that in the case of a chance process with a countable infinity of possible
outcomes, one can identify a prior with the true hypothesis in its support that can be expected to fail to
converge to the truth.
2 Note that while the truth (i.e., the coin is fair) can be represented either by the single parameter value
p ¼ 1
2
in the continuous parameter set [0, 1] or by means of the trivial model MF containing only the
single probability distribution Bðn; 1
2
Þ in the discrete set of models, the false hypothesis that the coin is
biased towards heads (tails) does not correspond to a point hypothesis in the parameter space of p.
3 I will call a model ‘true’ if and only if it contains the true probability distribution.
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not spread out over the space of possible models runs against the methodological
advice generally given by philosophers with Bayesian inclinations. Since the
posterior probability of a model with zero prior probability will always remain zero
by Bayesian updating, Bayesian philosophers generally take a ‘liberal’ stance when
it comes to the assignment of non-zero prior probabilities. However, even when
adopting such a liberal attitude the set of candidate models does not necessarily
contain the true model. Put more strongly, there are good reasons to believe that
identifying a true model before analysing data is too good to be true. Indeed,
Gelman and Shalizi (2013) adopt a critical stance towards the idea that in a
statistical analysis, a researcher is able to identify a priori a statistical model that
captures all the systematic influences among the variables of the system of interest
in their correct functional form. They (2013, p. 9) comment that ‘‘[t]his could
happen, but we have never seen it, and in social science we have never seen
anything that comes close’’. These worries are, however, not exclusive to the social
sciences. In climate science, for instance, it is often pointed out that all current
climate models are false (e.g., Parker 2009). These considerations naturally lead to
the question of what will happen in a Bayesian analysis if the true model is
excluded.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some plausible
convergence criteria for the case in which the truth is excluded in a Bayesian
analysis. Section 3 presents the fair-balance paradox. Section 4 discusses some
modifications of the paradox. Section 5 concludes.
2 Convergence Without Truth
Under the ideal scenario of an infinitely large data set an inference procedure should
show certain desirable features. For instance, in Bayesian parameter estimation a
reasonable requirement is that the posterior probability distribution becomes
increasingly peaked around the true parameter value for any non-pathological
sequence of data. Similarly, the model posterior probability distribution should
become peaked on the true model as data size goes to infinity in Bayesian model
selection. In our setting, however, the true model MF has zero prior probability and,
hence, the posterior probability of MF will remain zero by Bayesian updating. So,
what would be a reasonable requirement on an agent’s degrees of beliefs as the data
size goes to infinity? Lewis et al. (2005) propose that ideally the posterior
probability of MH should converge in probability to the constant value 1/2 when n
goes to infinity (and the same applies to model MT ).
4 That is, the sequence of model
posterior probabilities, constituting a sequence of random variables, is supposed to
converge in probability to the (trivial) random variable taking only the constant
value 1/2 as data accumulate.
Lewis et al.’s convergence criterion can be generalised to what might be referred
to as an ‘A Posteriori Indifference Principle’ (APIP). Rather than considering the
4 A sequence of random variables Xn is said to converge in probability to the random variable X if and
only if for all [ 0 the probability PðjXn  Xj[ Þ goes to 0 as n goes to infinity.
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head-bias and tail-bias models, I will phrase the principle in a slightly more general
framework for reasons that will become clear in the course of the paper. Let the
generalised head-bias model MGH contain all Binomial distributions B(n, p) with
parameter p that lies strictly between 1/2 ? c and 1 (i.e., p 2 ð1
2
þ c; 1Þ), where c is a
fixed value satisfying 0 c\ 1
2
. It is assumed that model MGH has prior probability
1/2 and assigns prior probabilities to parameter p based on the uniform probability
distribution on the interval ð1
2
þ c; 1Þ.5 The generalised tail-bias model then contains
all Binomial distributions B(n, p) with parameter p that lies strictly between 0 and
1
2
 c (i.e., p 2 ð0; 1
2
 cÞ). Similarly, it is assumed that model MGT has prior
probability 1/2 and assigns prior probabilities to parameter p based on the uniform
probability distribution Uð0; 1
2
 cÞ. Given these assumptions APIP reads as follows:
As the number of fair coin tosses n goes to infinity, the model posterior
probability distribution should converge to a probability distribution that is
indifferent among the false candidate models MGH and MGT .
Having introduced APIP, it is natural to ask how the principle can be motivated. A
natural answer invokes Bayesian confirmation theory. According to the ‘absolute
notion’ of Bayesian confirmation, data D confirm hypothesis H if and only if the
posterior probability P(H|D) is strictly larger than some threshold value k. Further,
data D disconfirm hypothesis H if and only if PðHjDÞ\k. The threshold value k is
typically set at 1/2 (e.g., Achinstein 2001, p. 46). The reason for this choice of k is
that it assures H having higher degree of belief than its negation :H after observing
D, if D confirms H. It is typically assumed that an adequate account of confirmation
should disconfirm false hypotheses and confirm true hypotheses as the data
accumulate (e.g., Hawthorne 2011, p. 336). Applying this dictum to the coin tossing
example would demand that both models MGH and MGT are to be disconfirmed as
the number of fair coin tosses goes to infinity. However, this requirement violates
the axioms of the probability calculus. The best one can expect is that each false
model is not to be confirmed as the data size increases. This intuition leads to the
requirement that the posterior probability of each model approaches 1/2 as the data
size goes to infinity and is captured by APIP.
In addition, the two false models MGH and MGT are equidistant from the truth
measured in terms of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Following Dawid
(1999), the KL divergence between a model M and the true distribution P is then
understood as the infimum of the KL divergences between P and the probability
distributions inM. Given that the two false modelsMGH andMGT are equally distant
from the truth, it should become less probable for the evidence to prefer one model
to the other as the data accumulate. This requirement translates into to the condition
that the posterior probability of each model approaches 1/2 as the number of coin
tosses goes to infinity and is again captured in probabilistic terms by APIP.
Analogous results obtain when adopting the more prominent ‘relative notion’ of
Bayesian confirmation, according to which data D confirm hypothesis H if and only
5 Note that the head-bias model MH results from choosing c ¼ 0 in the specification of the generalised
head-bias MGH .
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if the posterior probability P(H|D) is strictly larger than the prior probability of the
hypothesis H, P(H). Further, data D disconfirm hypothesis H if and only if
PðHjDÞ\PðHÞ. Since the two candidate models MGH and MGT are assumed to have
equal prior probability of 1/2, the intuition that the probability of one model being
confirmed goes to zero as the number of coin tosses goes to infinity is again captured
by APIP.
The intuition underlying APIP reflects a kind of epistemic modesty by assigning
intermediate rather than extreme degrees of belief to the false candidate models in
the limit.6 One could argue, however, that the concern is not necessarily that the
model posterior probabilities differ from the precise numerical value 1/2 in the limit
but that the model posterior probabilities converge in probability to random
variables taking either very large or very small values. As such APIP is to be seen as
a stronger version of the following requirement, which might be called a ‘Bayesian
Modesty Principle’ (BMP):
As the number of fair coin tosses n goes to infinity, the probability that the
posterior probability of MGH is larger than, say, 0.9 should converge to 0. The
same applies to the posterior probability of model MGT .
Again, Bayesian confirmation theory helps to motivate this principle. Suppose we
assume the relative notion of confirmation. In contrast to APIP, BMP does not
demand that a false model, say, MGH is not confirmed as the data size goes to
infinity. As a result BMP cannot be motivated by focusing exclusively on qualitative
confirmation statements. In order to illustrate the intuition underlying BMP, we
have to consider a quantitative account of confirmation. Quantitative accounts of
confirmation involve the concept of a degree of confirmation, which indicates how
strongly data D confirm hypothesis H. Let us, for instance, consider the difference
measure made popular by Carnap (1962)7: dðD;HÞ ¼ PðHjDÞ  PðDÞ. Suppose D
confirms H. Then, the larger the value of d(D, H), the stronger the inductive support
for H provided by the data D. Now, if BMP holds, then the probability ofMGH being
strongly confirmed goes to zero as the data size goes to infinity (here, ‘strongly
confirmed’ means that the difference measure takes a value that is larger than the
arbitrary threshold value 0.4).
3 Fair-Balance Paradox
While the previous section provided some arguments for the desirability of APIP
and BMP, the question remains whether these principles are, in fact, satisfied. In
order to address the empirical validity of these principles, let us focus on the
behaviour of the model posterior probability of the head-bias model MH for the sake
of simplicity. Yang (2007) demonstrates that if the the truth is that the coin is fair,
the posterior probability of MH converges in probability to a random variable with
6 An alternative way of looking at APIP is to view this principle as a strengthening or extension of
statistical consistency.
7 More recent proponents of the difference measure include Eells (1982) and Jeffrey (1992).
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the uniform distribution U(0, 1) for n going to infinity. That is, the posterior
probability of the false model MH converges, but not to a constant value. Phrased
differently, the posterior probability of model MH is drawn ‘randomly’ from the
interval (0, 1) when the data sets become infinitely large based on tossing a fair
coin. These analytic results are in accordance with simulation studies showing that
for data sets of size n ¼ 106 the posterior probability distribution of MH mirrors the
uniform distribution U(0, 1) (Yang 2007). That is, if you simulate the fair-coin
experiment a million times, then the empirical distribution of the posterior
probability of MH approximates the uniform distribution on the interval (0, 1). The
phenomenon that the posterior probability of MH fails to converge to the single
numerical value 1/2 for n going to infinity has been labelled the ‘fair-balance
paradox’ in the biological literature.
The fair-balance paradox reveals an undesirable feature of the Bayesian approach
to scientific inference as it violates both APIP and BMP. Consider APIP first. Rather
than converging in probability to a random variable with the single value 1/2 as
required by APIP, the posterior probability of MH converges in probability to a
random variable with the uniform distribution U(0, 1) if the coin is fair. Hence, the
Bayesian approach tends to confirm one of the false candidate models as data
accumulate. Further, the model MH will be strongly confirmed with probability 0.1
in the limit. So, as the posterior probability of MH converges in probability to a
random variable with the uniform distribution U(0, 1), there exists, in violation of
BMP, a non-vanishing probability that this model posterior probability is larger than
0.9 in the limit.
It is important to stress that even though the true fair-coin model MF has zero
prior probability and, hence, the prior probability distribution on the discrete space
of models (including the fair-coin model, the head-bias model and the tail-bias
model) does not have full support, the entire prior probability distribution on
parameter p is of full support in the sense that it assigns positive probability to every
open neighbourhood of every point hypothesis regarding the probability of ‘heads’
of the coin. Phrased differently, in the model selection problem the truth is excluded
since the true model MF has zero prior probability in the discrete model space. In
contrast, the truth is in the support of the prior when focusing on the entire prior
probability distribution on parameter p in the continuous parameter space. An
alternative way of describing the relationship between the model prior and the prior
on parameter p is to state that while the prior on parameter p is indifferent over all
possible values of p, the model prior is not indifferent over the three possible models
MF;MH and MT .
Since the fair-balance paradox is based on a chance process (i.e., coin tossing)
with a finite number of possible outcomes, the prior on parameter p is consistent in
the statistical sense of the term (Freedman 1963).8 This becomes apparent when
mapping the posterior probability distribution of parameter p: as the data size
increases the posterior probability distribution of p becomes more and more
8 A prior probability distribution P0 is consistent at h 2 H if given hypothesis h the probability for
observing a sequence of outcomes that gives rise to a sequence of posterior probability distributions
ðP1;P2; :::Þ that does not become more and more tightly peaked around parameter value h is zero. A prior
probability distribution P0 is called consistent if it is consistent at every h 2 H.
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concentrated around the true parameter value p ¼ 1
2
(see figure 2 in Lewis et al.
(2005)). So, focusing exclusively on the posterior probabilities of the models MH
and MT in the fair-balance paradox does not provide a comprehensive picture of the
underlying chance process.
An agent who thinks that all information necessary for Bayesian model selection
is contained in the model posterior probabilities and that these posterior quantities
indicate the relative plausibilities of the candidate models is referred to as an
‘overconfident’ Bayesian by Morey et al. (2013). The fair-balance paradox
reinforces the view that an exclusive focus on model posterior probabilities does
not provide a satisfactory account of inference as the model posteriors fail to
adequately report the relative plausibilities of the two candidate models. In contrast,
Morey et al. refer to a ‘humble’ Bayesian as an agent who questions the models used
for inference and invokes a variety of Bayesian tools, including posterior
distributions, model odds and Bayes factors for model checking. In a simple
example such as the fair-balance paradox already using both the posterior
probability distribution on parameter p and the model posteriors suffices to indicate
problems with the initial choice of candidate models and, hence, serves the need of
the humble Bayesian.
4 Modifying the Paradox
One essential characteristic of the fair-balance paradox is its symmetry: the
candidate models are equidistant from the truth. Furthermore, the parameter p in the
false models MH and MT gets infinitely close to the true parameter value p ¼ 1=2.
While the second feature follows naturally from identifying the hypothesis ‘The
coin is biased towards heads’ with model MH (and, similarly, identifying the
hypothesis ‘The coin is biased towards tails’ with model MT ) and does not affect the
example’s function to put APIP and BMP to the test, a natural question to ask is
what happens in cases where the false candidate models are still equidistant from
the truth but do not come arbitrarily close to the true parameter value. One might
suspect that the paradox disappears in such a setting.
In order to address this question, I will consider the following two models: the
strong head-bias model MSH contains all Binomial distributions B(n, p) with
parameter p located strictly between 1/2 ? c and 1 (i.e., p 2 ð1
2
þ c; 1Þ) with a fixed
value c satisfying 0\ c\ 1
2
. As a result the parameter denoting the probability of
‘heads’ of the candidate model MSH does not get infinitely close to the true
parameter value p ¼ 1
2
. Again, it is assumed that modelMSH has prior probability 1/2
and assigns prior probabilities to parameter p based on the uniform probability
distribution Uð1
2
þ c; 1Þ.9 The strong tail-bias model MST then contains all Binomial
distributions B(n, p) with parameter p located strictly between 0 and 1
2
 c (i.e.,
p 2 ð0; 1
2
 cÞ). Similarly, it is assumed that model MST has prior probability 1/2 and
9 Note that the strong head-bias model MSH results from the generalised head-bias model MGH by
excluding the choice of constant c being equal to 0.
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assigns prior probabilities to parameter p based on the uniform probability
distribution Uð0; 1
2
 cÞ.
In both the fair-balance paradox and the modified coin tossing example the true
model has zero prior probability. As a result the model prior is not indifferent over
all possible models in both examples. In contrast to the fair-balance paradox where
the prior on parameter p does have full support, the truth is not in the support of the
prior on parameter p in the modified coin tossing problem. Phrased differently,
while the prior on parameter p is indifferent over all possible values of p in the fair-
balance paradox, it is not indifferent in the modified coin tossing problem.
The posterior probability of MSH converges in probability to a random variable
that takes the value 0 with probability 1/2 and the value 1 with probability 1/2 as the
number of coin tosses goes to infinity (see Theorem 1, ‘‘Appendix’’).10 Given the
symmetry of the problem the same applies to the posterior probability of MST . It
follows that one of the two false models will, with probability 1, be strongly
confirmed in the limit. Even though the resulting limiting behaviour differs between
the head-bias model MH and the strong head-bias model MSH , the fair-balance
paradox persists since both APIP and BMP are again violated. There is a sense,
however, in which the move towards the models MSH and MST aggravates the
problem as the probability of a candidate model being strongly confirmed in the
limit increases significantly.
The discussion shows that two plausible constraints on Bayesian convergence,
referred to as APIP and BMP, do not hold. Both the original fair-balance paradox
involving the head-bias and the tail-bias models and the modified fair-balance
paradox involving the strong head-bias and the strong tail-bias models violate these
two principles. Indeed, the modified coin tossing problem increases the probability
of confirming a false model with a high degree of confirmation.
Before concluding a final comment is in order. Both the fair-balance paradox and
its modification consider false models with equal distance from the truth due to the
symmetry of the set-up. This approach differs from a situation in which the truth is
excluded from the set of candidate models but these models have different distances
from the truth. In the latter scenario Bayesian inference typically shows a much
more benign face. To illustrate, consider the following two candidate models: The
asymmetric head-bias model MAH contains all Binomial distributions B(n, p) with
parameter p that lies strictly between 1/2 ? c1 and 1 (i.e., p 2 ð12þ c1; 1Þ) with a
fixed value c1 satisfying 0\c1\ 12. The asymmetric tail-bias model MAT then
contains all Binomial distributions B(n, p) with parameter p that lies strictly
between 0 and 1
2
 c2 (i.e., p 2 ð0; 12 c2Þ) with 0\c2\ 12 and c1 6¼ c2. Again, it is
assumed that the two modelsMAH andMAT have equal prior probability and assign a
uniform prior to parameter p over the relevant intervals. Suppose model MAH is
closer to the truth than model MAT (i.e., c1\c2). It follows from general results on
Bayesian convergence (Dawid 1999) that the posterior probability of the false
10 This result on the asymptotic behaviour of model posterior probabilities sits well with work on
Bayesian convergence under a misspecified model (Berk 1966). Generally speaking, if there is no
probability distribution that is uniquely closest to the truth, the posterior probability distribution will
alternate between concentrating around several minima.
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model with the closest distance to the truth (as measured by KL divergence)
converges in probability to 1 as the data size goes to infinity.
5 Conclusion
Good methods of scientific inference are expected to have desirable limiting
features as the data size goes to infinity. The fair-balance paradox and its
modification reveal an unattractive feature of the Bayesian approach to scientific
inference. When choosing between two false candidate models that are equidistant
from the truth, the Bayesian approach tends to confirm a false candidate model
when the data size grows infinitely. As such, Bayesian inference violates two
desirable principles, the A Posteriori Indifference Principle and the Bayesian
Modesty Principle, set out in this paper.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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Appendix
Theorem 1 The posterior probability of MSH converges in probability to a random
variable that takes the value 0 with probability 1
2
and the value 1 with probability 1
2
as the number of coin tosses n goes to infinity. The same applies to the posterior
probability of MST .
Proof Let p denote the proportion of heads in n fair coin tosses. Further, let a be a
real number that lies strictly between 0 and 0.5. Then, by the Berry-Esseen Theo-
rem, the probability of event E that p lies between 12 n0:5a and 12 c converges
to 1
2
as n!1. Similarly, the probability of the event Eþ that p lies between
1
2
þ n0:5a and 1
2
þ c converges to 1
2
as n!1.
By definition we have
PðpjMSHÞ ¼
Z 1
1
2
þc
Pðpjp ¼ xÞ 1
1
2
 c dx:
Now consider what happens when E occurs. In that case the following inequality
holds
PðpjMSHÞP pjp ¼ 1
2
þ c
 
:
The Central Limit Theorem yields
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P pjp ¼ 1
2
þ c
 
 1
rn
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p exp

 ðp ð
1
2
þ cÞÞ2
2r2n

;
where r2n ¼ pð1pÞn ¼ ð14 c2Þ=n.
Conditional on E, the quantity p ð12þ cÞ lies between 2c and c n0:5a.
Hence, we have the following asymptotic inequality
PðpjMSHÞB1
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
exp
 Anðcþ n0:5aÞ2; ð1Þ
with A ¼ 1
2ð1
4
c2Þ and B1 ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ2pp 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1
4
c2
p .
Let us now turn to model MST . By definition we have
PðpjMSTÞ ¼
Z 1
2
c
0
Pðpjp ¼ xÞ 1
1
2
 c dx:
Again, consider what happens when E occurs. In that case the following inequality
holds (when considering an interval of size 1
n2
to the left of 1
2
 c)
PðpjMSTÞ 11
2
 c 
1
n2
P pjp ¼ 1
2
 c 1
n2
 
:
The Central Limit Theorem tells us that
P pjp ¼ 1
2
 c 1
n2
 
 1
rn
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p exp

 ðp ð
1
2
 c 1
n2
ÞÞ2
2r2n

:
Conditional on E, the quantity p ð12 c 1n2Þ lies between 1n2 and
c n0:5a þ 1
n2
. Hence, we have the following asymptotic inequality
PðpjMSTÞB2
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
exp An c n0:5a þ n2 2  1
n2
; ð2Þ
with B2 ¼ 11
2
c
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
4
c2
p .
Then, conditional on E, we get the following inequality by combining (1) and
(2)
PðpjMSHÞ
PðpjMSTÞ 
B1
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
exp An cþ n0:5a 2 
B2
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
exp An c n0:5a þ n2ð Þ2
 
1
n2
:
The right hand side reduces to
B1
B2
n2 exp A 4cn0:5a þ 2cn1  2n1:5a þ n3  ;
which converges to 0 as n!1. As a result we have
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PðpjMSHÞ
PðpjMSTÞ ! 0
as n!1. In other words, conditional on E, the likelihood ratio of MSH to MST
converges to 0. By a similar argument, conditional on Eþ, the likelihood ratio of
MST to MSH converges to 0.
By applying Bayes’s theorem we get the following expression for the posterior
probability of MST :
PðMST jpÞ ¼ 1ð1þ RÞ ;
where
R ¼
1
2
PðpjMSHÞ
1
2
PðpjMSTÞ
:
And so if PðpjMSHÞ=PðpjMSTÞ converges to 0 as n!1, then so does PðMSH jpÞ. In
summary, as n!1, PðMST jpÞ converges to 0 with probability 0.5, and converges
to 1 with probability 0.5. h
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